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Anarchism and critical management studies: a 
reflection from an anarchist studies perspective 
Ruth Kinna 
Riding the wave of nearly twenty years of global activism, anarchism has 
established a niche hold in a diverse range of research fields.  It would be a wild 
exaggeration to say that anarchism research has entered the mainstream, but 
hardly an embellishment to argue that the possibilities of the anarchist turn have 
been recognised by significant groups of scholars.  Richard J. White and Colin C. 
Williams, in their contribution to this special issue, outline the potential for 
critical management studies: anarchism not only offers a framework to ‘expose, 
subvert and undermine’ dominant assumptions about the social order but also a 
set of distinctive and innovative alternatives to it.   
The value of adopting an anarchist squint in CMS might be measured by the 
challenges involved. A number of contributors explain the want of anarchism in 
the field by pointing to the fundamental tension that exists between the concepts 
with which CMS operates and the ethical principles that anarchism champions. 
Benjamin Franks probes definitions of ‘business’ and ‘management’ to identify a 
‘corporocentric’ value system in business ethics which ‘privileges market values’ 
and runs counter to the bioethics of social anarchism. Patrick Reedy observes 
similar problems with accepted conceptions of ‘organisation’. Starting from 
Ahrne and Brunsson’s ‘complete’ formulation, he argues that this assumes the 
existence of hierarchy and a highly centralised apparatus for decision-making 
which regulates members by command, compliance-monitoring and sanctions. 
These impossibly strict criteria not only run counter to ordinary-language 
understandings of organisation, suggesting that some groups called 
organisations are in fact something else (would the OECD qualify as an 
organisation on these criteria?) they also normalise a set of practices and 
ephemera: theory & politics in organization  14(4): 611-621 
612 | preface 
behaviours that are antithetical to any conceivable form of anarchism.  As a 
result, however, Reedy argues that anarchism ‘suggests a different set of 
evaluative criteria for thinking about the everyday practices of alternative 
organisations. Even the simple but rarely considered idea that organisation 
should primarily exist in order to meet the material, existential and social needs 
and desires of its participants creates and evaluates space that moves us beyond 
the usual consideration of struggle and resistance in conventional workplaces’. In 
other words, because CMS appears to operate in a conceptual universe that is 
hostile to anarchist perspectives and testing for anarchists to negotiate, it’s 
possible to find a positive stimulus for CMS in anarchist thinking. Indeed, the 
inventive and productive ways that anarchism has approached questions of 
organisation in theory and through practical experimentation might be seen as 
its primary contribution to CMS. 
Anarchism and organisation 
‘Anarchists are not against organization’. Martin Parker, George Cheney, Valerie 
Fournier and Chris Land are of course right, but the contrary view remains 
stubbornly persistent. The idea that anarchism is against organisation is not 
explained solely by the historical misrepresentation of anarchist thought: some 
anarchists have argued that the capacity for groups and individuals to behave 
anarchistically makes the construction of organisational systems redundant and 
potentially risky. Anti-organisation currents cut across the left-right, communist-
individualist divide that Franks discusses and they are not restricted to the forms 
of Stirnerism lampooned by Fernando Pessoa (which Brigitte Biehl-Missal and 
Raymond Saner examine).  However, there’s a considerable distance between the 
principles of anarchist anti-organisationalism and the anti-organisation  ideas 
that critics of anarchism ascribe to anarchists without discrimination.  
As Pierre Guillet de Monthoux’s essay suggests, one of the central tenets of the 
anti-anarchist anti-organisation thesis is the apparent resonance of classical elitist 
critique with anarchism. On this account, Robert Michels’s iron law of oligarchy 
exposes a truth about bureaucratic degeneration and the effects of state 
centralisation which anarchists might accept. However, the conflation of elitism 
with anarchism encourages a parallel elision of organisation with hierarchy. 
Correctly understood as an antonym for hierarchy, or priestly rule, anarchy is 
thus also wrongly interpreted as the antonym of organisation. Proudhon 
described anarchy as ‘no-rule’, yet it appears to stand for no rules, underpinned 
by a philosophical critique of authority that renders decision-making impossible. 
This construction works against anarchism in two ways. As anti-authoritarians, 
anarchists emerge as critics of organisation by default, whether or not they 
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actually call themselves anti-organisationist, and hopelessly idealistic to boot. 
Indeed, in the light of Michels’ insistence that anarchist communism was not an 
exception to the ‘law’ that he formulated, (though he argued that it was more 
resistant than either syndicalism or parliamentary socialism, the main target of 
his attack), the presumed anarchist rejection of organisation appears futile. 
Unlike elitists, who embrace  the oligarchic tendencies apparently latent in 
organisation, anarchists can only advocate for fluid alternative practices knowing 
that they will inevitably solidify time or, as Frenzel’s analysis of climate camps 
shows, by mirroring what are deemed to be statist practices. For as long as 
anarchist conventions are described in oppositional terms, anarchism will 
inescapably be shown to be incapable of delivering any of the functions that 
organisation makes possible. At the same time, concepts that feed into 
contestable mainstream conceptions of organisation (of ‘decision-making’, ‘rule’, 
‘membership’ and so forth) remain unexamined. 
Anarchists who explicitly disavow organisation sometimes appear to follow the 
logic of this argument and moralise the concept. As Fabian Frenzel argues, this 
is the approach taken by Ahrne and Burnsson, which he also adopts. Hierarchy, 
membership, rules, monitoring and sanctions, he argues, are entailed by 
organisation. Networks, on the other hand, ‘are social forms without 
organization’. In anarchist circles, organisation is sometimes conflated with a 
particular idea of power. Bob Black’s view is that ‘organization makes inevitable 
the crushing of an individual who is right by a machine which is wrong’ (1994: 
48-9). The worry here is about fetishism and the homogenising, disciplining 
practices that allegiance to policy encourages. Members of organisations might 
not seek to oppress others, but they nonetheless end up coercing them because 
they prioritise the well-being of the organisation over the interests of any of its 
members.  
Anarchist anxieties about organisation are more productively read in the context 
of the new elitism of sociologists like C. Wright Mills than the classical elitism of 
Michels. Anarchists might agree that Michels pinpointed some of the factors that 
contribute to the degeneration of even radical groups and the centralising 
tendencies active on organisations operating within the framework of the state. 
This was precisely the point that Gustav Landauer made of the German Social 
Democratic Party. It played, he argued, on the ‘reactionary tendency of an 
oppressed people’ in ‘the most shameful way’ to construct ‘an extremely strict 
party rule ... strong enough to crush on every occasion the rising germs of 
freedom and revolt’ (Landauer, 1896?: 2). Nevertheless, critics of party politics 
like Landauer approached organisation as critics of elitism, not as elitists fearful 
of ‘the mass’ and the principle of democracy.  
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Unlike elitists, anarchists have often distinguished between organisation as a 
social practice and organisation as a statist form. This was the approach adopted 
by Colin Ward, who features in several of the contributions here. As a result, 
some anarchists have defined anarchism in explicitly – and critics might say 
narrowly – organisational terms. To quote one activist group, anarchism might 
be defined ‘simultaneously’ as ‘both a critique of authoritarian forms of 
organisation which foster manipulation and passivity, and a theory of free 
organisation… organised from below rather than without’ (Black and Red, 1977). 
Even those who might quibble with this description normally accept that 
anarchism has an organisational dimension: the idea that organisation need not 
entail hierarchy is hardly contentious. As Black argues, Stirner’s Union of 
Egoists, the thinnest organisational current within anarchism, is a form of 
organisation – ‘for mutual self-help for just so long (and no longer) as it suited 
any egoist to deal with it’ (Black, 1992: 184).  
Acknowledging the limitations of anti-anarchist organisation critique raises some 
thorny issues about the potential for anarchist or anarchistic organising within 
the statist organisational mainstream. This is the theme in several of the essays. 
Chris Land and Daniel King present a case study of a UK voluntary sector 
organisation to illustrate the enormous pressures active on radical groups to 
adopt practices that run counter to their professed aims. Equally, examining the 
attitudes of French publishing and multimedia workers, Elen Riot argues that the 
prospects for the adoption of anarchist organisational practices are remote where 
there is no collective memory of lived, shared experiences. It might be argued, as 
Marcelo Vieta contends, that history is a potent source for contemporary 
activism. Riot believes otherwise. And even though she finds that an awareness 
of historical traditions helps shape contemporary projects, she argues that 
anarchism cannot be learned from historians. Riot is not alone in squeezing out 
the ghosts. Perhaps because anarchism has come to scholarly attention through 
recent global activism, the outstanding contribution of anarchist organising to 
CMS seems to come from recent practical activity, especially social movement 
practice, not from anarchist history.  
Anarchism and the anarchistic 
The tension between anarchism and the anarchistic or the conditions that 
anarchists variously link to anarchy and the possibility of challenging orthodox 
organisational behaviours through radical experimentation informed by social 
movement activism is examined by a number of contributors. Marius De Geus’s 
discussion of Kropotkin’s work gets to the heart of this tension. In Mutual Aid, 
he argues, Kropotkin presented a historical sociology of the state in which he 
Ruth Kinna Anarchism and critical management studies 
preface | 615 
highlighted the continued existence of un-colonised traditional communities that 
remained under the radar of the state and the resilience of anarchistic practices 
that by-passed or resisted statist controls. Kropotkin’s account pointed to the 
interruption or inhibition of a potential for social development, which he linked 
to an evolving and increasingly self-conscious expression of anarchist ethics. 
Anarchism, he argued, described a commitment to the protection of these 
residual communities and the fostering of the anarchistic behaviours they 
encouraged in conditions that were inimical to them: the historical rise of the 
state in Western Europe left both traditional and new mutual aid societies 
vulnerable to further encroachments.  Anarchism, on this account, described a 
politics committed to the expansion or defence of these communities. For 
Kropotkin, as De Geus explains, it included a theory of change and entailed 
advocacy for communism in order to ground fully anarchistic practices and to 
protect against future degeneration. Kropotkin’s twin concerns were the 
possibility of unlimited individual accumulation and the creation of economic 
inequalities that might support the establishment of systems of political 
subordination and/or the concentration of political power facilitating 
institutionalised injustice through slavery and exploitation. Yet Kropotkin’s idea 
was that the process of revolutionary change would support social and cultural 
diversity. Anarchy would provide the space for communities to devise their own 
social practices and codes of behaviour which, for Kropotkin, had the potential to 
support the expression of an anarchist ethics. 
J. Christopher Paskewich’s discussion of Colin Ward’s adaptation of Kropotkin’s 
thesis in Anarchy in action demonstrates how the tenor of this argument has 
changed in the post-war period, where wholesale structural change appears 
unfeasible. Ward’s two key observations, Paskewich argues, were that ‘[p]eople in 
every country around the world have created some spaces or groups that are self-
determining and non-hierarchical’ and that ‘people have been encouraged to 
misunderstand their own natures’ as competitive rather than co-operative. Also 
drawing on Ward, White and Williams make a similar point. They note: 
‘anarchism ... is a description of a mode of human organisation, rooted in the 
experience of everyday life, which operates side by side with, and in spite of the 
dominant trends of our society’.  One effect of this recasting has been to treat 
everyday practices as exemplars of anarchy rather than, as Kropotkin argued, 
sites for the expression of an ethics which demonstrated the viability of anarchist 
revolutionary politics. For White and Williams, the empirical analysis of 
household work shows that ‘anarchist forms of organisation – underpinned by 
mutual aid, reciprocity, co-operation, collaboration and inclusion – are found to 
be deeply woven into the fabric of everyday “capitalist” life’. Another 
consequence is to identify the characteristics of social movement organising – 
networks, syndicates, autonomous groups, collectives and affinity groups – to 
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show how principles that underpin experiments might be transferred from one 
location to anarchise another.  
Paskewich finds a key to management orthodoxy in autonomy, creativity and 
freedom. Simon Western similarly uses contemporary movement practices to 
delineate a conception of autonomist leadership based on values of spontaneity, 
autonomy, mutualism, networks and affect. Notwithstanding anarchist rejections 
of leadership, he argues that autonomist leadership is consistent with anarchism. 
Parker, Cheney, Fournier and Land propose three principles to develop 
alternatives to mainstream management norms: individual autonomy, solidarity 
and responsibility to the future. It’s difficult to object to any of these, but there’s a 
risk that the structural conditions which, in Kropotkin’s view, inhibit the full 
realisation of these values, becomes divorced from their independent evaluation. 
In this way, the aspirations of anarchists who organise in projects, setting up 
infoshops, zines, skools, squats and housing co-operatives, in kitchens, gardens, 
bicycle workshops and micro-breweries are adapted to modify precisely the 
institutions that activists seek to abandon. 
David Bell highlights a philosophical risk with the analysis of anarchist 
principles. Anarchism, he notes, ‘is frequently (mis)understood as the belief in 
absolute freedom, which is (to be) brought about through the eradication of 
hierarchies that impose power over the individual.’  Canonical writers including 
Stirner, Proudhon, Bakunin and Rocker expressed wariness of treating any 
concept as an ‘absolute’. Even while describing himself as a fanatical lover of 
liberty, Bakunin recognised that the freedom was defined differently by elites 
than by those excluded from this group and would remain always contestable. 
Biehl-Missal and Saner’s discussion of Pessoa’s story of the anarchist banker 
highlights the absurdities that follow from the apparently rigorous application of 
an abstract idea – also individual freedom. Although the context is shaped by an 
equally problematic desire to seek an escape from all ‘social fictions’, Pessoa’s 
treatment of anarchist freedom provides the Banker with a justification to amass 
unlimited wealth in order to resist the controlling influence of money. Avoiding 
the pitfalls of abstract analysis, Bell returns to a practice-based approach, 
examining a self-consciously alternative collective musical improvisation as an 
ideal form. The risk of seeking to replicate these practices, Bell notes, is 
recuperation. De Monthoux notes the smooth corruption of Jerry Rubin’s ‘do it’ 
into a sales pitch for pliant consumption; invitations to workplace morning raves, 
motivated by a bid to improve productivity and team-working, speak to a similar 
process of absorption and manipulation (Campagna, 2013). But there’s another 
risk that Bell overlooks. He argues that a commitment to communism, 
understood as a Marxist critique of material relations, is required to provide the 
necessary reinforcement to anarchist organisational experiments. Re-injecting 
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Wardian analysis of anarchist practices with a Kropotkinite concern to realise 
structural change, Bell by-passes anarchist theory in favour of Marxist analysis.  
Angela Wigger notes that anarchism has sometimes been described as 
Marxism’s poor cousin, lacking a distinctive critique or analysis of capitalism. 
What anarchism ‘lacks’, however, is a theoretical touchstone. Because anarchism 
has produced different sociologies of the state, provided an array of 
anthropological studies of stateless living and offered a range of critiques of 
capitalism, variously inflected with class, feminist, queer, ecological and 
postcolonial thinking, anarchists differ significantly in their treatment and 
understanding of anarchism. The weight that groups or individuals attach to 
particular organisational principles will depend on the ways in which any of these 
themes and approaches are understood and combined, delimited by possibilities 
of existing practice. Nevertheless, it is possible to elaborate anarchist theory and 
to consider both the extent of the overlaps with non-anarchist forms of socialism 
and the significant questions that anarchism asks about the purposes of 
organisation. 
Kropotkin is part of a significant anarchist tradition which rejects the legitimacy 
of the state’s regulation of the political and/or the economic sphere, either for the 
sake of protecting the freedoms said to be contained within the other, or in 
search of some sort of ideal balance. As Franks argues, this current of anarchist 
critique has not been trained on the possibility of regulating neo-liberal regimes 
by strengthening democratic controls. Its vision is typically revolutionary. In this 
context, the question that is properly put to Colin Ward about his suggestion ‘that 
anarchist organisations should be voluntary, functional, temporary and small’ is 
not ‘functional for who?’ (as Parker et al. ask)  but, ‘functional for what?’ This is 
the tack taken by Andreas Chatzidakis, Gretchen Larsen and Simon Bishop. Do 
we, as they suggest, continue to organise for growth ‘where fulfilment, autonomy 
and freedom are sought through consumption’ or for ‘de-growth’? Should 
organisation be designed with a view to realising human flourishing and 
psychological well-being, as Ward’s contemporary Paul Goodman argued, or to 
meet the demands of consumer markets and shopping-mall economics? 
Anarchist bioethicists might define function in terms of the health of species or, 
as Franks puts it, the recognition of ‘the inherent value of all living entities’. 
Answers to these macro questions importantly shape the micro experiments 
which anarchists support. 
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Utopianism and prefiguration 
Critics often seize on the impossibility of anarchist politics. Yet the consistent 
application of anarchist critique is wrongly interpreted as an inability to analyse 
the distinctive harms that different systems support.  Anarchists are able to 
differentiate between market and legal freedoms and are sensitive to ways in 
which changes to regulatory policy produce different and more or less negative 
results for particular groups of people – the marginalised, exploited and 
disadvantaged. Indeed, anarchist ethics focus attention on the incentive 
structures and moral codes that underpin existing forms of organisation, as well 
as their effects.  In their discussion of Sorel, Norman Jackson and Pippa Carter 
comment that it has become ‘unacceptable, within the dominant discourse, to 
claim that the working class should be seen as oppressed’, notwithstanding the 
introduction of a catalogue of austerity measures that have resulted in the 
‘intensification of labour, infantilisation of the workforce, mass unemployment, 
absence of a living wage, zero hours contracts, unsafe working conditions’. 
Anarchists are not such purists that they prefer to ignore these realities for the 
sake of the revolution to come. On the contrary, the everyday judgments that 
activists make about struggle and resistance – openly discussed in a range of 
anarchist media – are typically informed by assessments of policy changes in 
particular in areas like immigration, asylum, education, food production, 
development, land rights and the exploitation of natural resources.  
Anarchist aspirations for change and the project of imagining alternative futures 
become unintelligible when anti-organisation arguments are read incautiously. 
Anarchists who seek to challenge the neo-liberal mantra ‘there is no alternative’ 
either emerge as misguided utopians because they are assumed to reject all that 
exists (‘organisation’) or prohibited from thinking about possible futures on the 
grounds that utopianism contravenes anarchism’s anti-organisational principles.  
Drawing on contemporary postanarchist theory, this is the argument that Carl 
Rhodes makes: 
Anarchy here is in the form of ‘ideological dissent’ that contests corporate 
sovereignty and power… Such a requirement is not to be based on the ideas that 
we might be graced, deux-ex-machina, by a new form of self-management where 
all forms of oppression dissipate; no fantastical utopians. Instead it involves a 
recognition that the space between sovereign organization and anarchic ethics 
must be maintained. Politically, this favours dissensus as a practical ethico-politics 
over utopianism as an impossible dream. Such an ethics is enacted through a 
‘project of ethico-political resistance and critique that works against forms of 
coercion, inequity, and discrimination that organization so frequently and easily 
produce. 
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Several contributors note that prefiguration, or the demand for consistency of 
means with ends, fills the space between contemporary practices and utopian 
ideas of anarchy. According to Wigger, prefiguration demands that ‘new forms of 
social organisation ought to be realised straightaway, while the means of social 
change must prefigure the anticipated anarchist future’. This formulation, 
however, suggests a division of activist practices, on the one hand, from long-
term goals and the strategies designed to meet them, on the other. While it is the 
case that ‘anarchists seek to stimulate solidarity activities and imitation’ by 
‘exemplary political actions’ prefiguration is more often described as a discussion 
about the interrelationship of present practices and future goals.  In some 
accounts, the means and ends of struggle are collapsed in social organising. 
Frenzel outlines this relationship: ‘Prefigurative politics focuses on the way of 
doing politics, its processes. The means of progressive politics need to be aligned 
with its ends’. Sandra Jeppesen et al. quote Federici and Caffentzis:  the ‘Anti-
capitalist commons are not the end-point of anti-capitalist struggle, but its 
means’. In other accounts, prefiguration involves reading between utopian 
aspirations and experience, developing new practices in the course of organising 
and in the light of reflection.  
As Vieta argues, the utopianism of anarchist prefigurative politics differs from 
the blueprint planning associated with early-nineteenth century utopian 
socialism or, for example, the less romantic kinds of blueprints devised Soviet 
planners.  In prefigurative politics utopian goals are themselves scrutinised as 
part of the practice of experimentation. For some activists, prefiguration is 
intimately linked to resistance activity because the imaginative spaces for utopian 
dreaming are said to occur only in moments of crisis. Even then, there can be 
considerable variation in the elaboration of anarchist goals. Land and King 
emphasise work-based principles, commenting that Ward argued that ‘[t]he 
autonomy of the worker at work is the most important field in which [the] 
expropriation of decision-making can apply.’ Vieta adopts a similar slant.  Other 
anarchists (including Kropotkin) have emphasised community as a primary 
sphere, perhaps more open to the idea that expropriation of decision-making can 
apply in fields outside work (for example in health care or education) equally 
important to the expropriated. For Simon Collister ‘hactivism offers a potent and 
powerful model of anarchist organizing’. It provides a ‘prefigurative framework 
for twenty-first century anarchist organizing which offers a rich potential for 
experimentation and the creation of socio-technological solutions out of the 
immanent, irreducible social space of Postanarchism’. 
In Jeppesen et al.’s work, prefiguration is linked to constitutive practices.  They 
describes how a process of calling out to reveal bigotry or privilege, racialised or 
gendered behaviours has given way to calling in, a process designed to resolve 
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tensions through care and compassion. Both approaches support the goal of non-
domination but the decision to pursue different methods importantly transforms 
the ethics of the group and changes the character of its organisational practices. 
The desire, they note, is ‘to focus on building bridges ... for gentleness, pleasure, 
enjoyment and passion in life and in organizing’.   
Constitutionalism, Paskewich notes, is typically associated with particular 
institutional doctrines, for example checks and balances or the separation of 
powers. Above all, it is associated with the desire to set decision-making 
arrangements in stone, in ways that render organisations incapable of 
confronting, still less addressing, forms of domination that arise subsequent to 
the constitutional settlement. On Jeppesen’s account of anarchist organising, 
prefigurative politics enables individuals to be flexible about group practices and 
the commitment to anarchist ethics itself provides the dynamic for continual 
revision and change. Groups are constituted in a manner that requires 
individuals to behave in particular ways – respectfully, hopefully, with kindness – 
but responsibility for the group’s constitution rests with the membership. 
Anarchist sociologies of the state and CMS analysis suggest that the adoption of 
these kinds of prefigurative practices in organisations constituted within or by 
the state is challenging, notwithstanding the widespread evidence that anarchy 
remains active in capitalist and statist societies. However, the value of anarchism 
to CMS does not depend on showing that anarchy exists or that it anarchism 
provides a solution to all the evils of neo-liberalism and the state, only that there 
are multiple points of entry into organisational practice and that the strength of 
critical approaches rests on their adaptability and combination. 
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